Summary: Should democracies punish hate speech? Eric Heinze, Professor of Law and Humanities at Queen Mary, University of London, has written an important new book on this subject, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship. At the center of Heinze's book is a revolutionary idea: Instead of debating whether democracies per se can or cannot legitimately ban hate speech (which assumes all democracies are the same), we should only condemn hate speech as illegitimate in those democracies that are longstanding, stable and prosperous. In this essay, I show how Heinze's idea frees the debate over hate speech regulation from the Europe vs. America dichotomy that has haunted it for years, while carrying a special poignancy for the United States in the age of Trump.
Introduction
Should democracies punish hate speech? If Francis Fukuyama was correct when he said, in his famous essay The End of History, that the "end point" of human evolution was "the universalization of Western liberal democracy, " 2 then one might expect democratic states around the globe would reach consensus on this question. Yet they do not agree; rather, there is a split between the United States, which does not allow bans on hate speech, and most other democracies, which allow such bans. 3 For the past 30 years, scholars from the United States and Europe have struggled to account for this lack of a common "end point. "
In general, the arguments have taken two forms: either one explains the divergence by specific cultural tendencies in the countries involved (the exceptionalism argument); or one adopts a universal answer to the question of hate speech regulation, and then fault those societies that fail to follow that standard. 4 Neither approach is satisfying. Exceptionalism runs into questions about causation -what does it mean to say the United States tolerates hate speech because of its political culture? How do we distinguish causation from correlation? What if there are multiple causes, how do we single out one as more important than another? Universalist or convergence approaches to the question, meanwhile, tend to generate endless debates because hate speech regulation becomes a question of principle. If democracies must converge upon a shared norm, the world becomes a dull, uniform place, in which difference is by definition heretical. 5 In the process, supporters of globalizing, convergence approaches fail to ask a key question: Are all democracies equally justified in tolerating or banning hate speech?
Wandering into this debate, Eric Heinze, Professor of Law and Humanities at Queen Mary, University of London, has written an important new book, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship. 6 Heinze's book offers a path-breaking advance over the tired debate between exceptionalism and convergence. At the center of Heinze's book is a revolutionary idea: Instead of debating whether democracies per se can or cannot legitimately ban hate speech (which assumes all democracies are the same), we should only condemn hate speech as illegitimate in those democracies that are longstanding, stable and prosperous.
7 Not only does this idea free the debate over hate speech regulation from the Europe vs. America dichotomy that has haunted it for years, it carries special poignancy for the United States in the age of Trump.
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Determinism and the Debate over Hate Speech Regulation
For Heinze, the global debate over hate speech regulation is too deterministic. 8 If hate speech regulation is the norm in Europe but not in the United States, the reason must rest on cultural or historical reasons that determine how a country responds to this question. Therefore, if the United States has largely tolerated hate speech since the 1960s, this is because of deep-rooted causes that go back to the founding of the country and are, for that very reason, unchangeable. The same applies to Europe: If Germany, France or Austria ban hate speech (or Holocaust denial) this is rooted in factors -such as the Nazi past -that an outsider could not possibly understand, let alone try to change.
9 As early as 2009, Heinze understood the problem when he described academic conferences on hate speech regulation as meetings taking place between American "wild west cowboys" and European "cheese eating surrender monkeys" who talk past each other.
10 In 2016 he adds that these "implausibly essentialist" 11 descriptions of Europe and America, even if correct in part, 12 push the discussion about hate speech regulation into a "determinist dichotomy between semi-civilized Americans revering aggressive individualism above all other values versus lethargically timorous Europeans yoked to government-dictated notions of the collective good. "
13
To be sure, Heinze is not the only one struggling to break free of the confining grasp of the Euro-American dichotomy. On the one hand, Yale University Law School Dean Robert Post has argued that hate speech bans have no place in any democracy.
14 A country that regulates hate speech is simply not democratic; on this view, Germany and France are -in theory, at least -no different from North Korea. 15 The reason for this rests on the nature of democratic legitimacy: , 1995, p. xii ( "[D] espite its claim to be a standard bearer of rights, the record of the United States on issues of race and violence is less than exemplary; it remains one of the most divisive and troubled countries in the world. ") 26 For example, in his introduction Heinze expresses his desire to overcome the assumptions that the debate over hate speech bans involves "a standoff between ' America' and 'European' approaches" to the issue and that the allowing hate speech is "suited only to US law and culture. " Heinze, Hate Speech, supra note 5, at 6-7. To the contrary, Heine observes that, because of their democratic solidity, "Northern European social-welfarist democracies will prove to be the best situated to abolish hate speech bans. " Ibid., p. discourse, yet remain adequately equipped to protect vulnerable groups from violence or discrimination"? If the answer is "yes, " then viewpoint-punitive bans of hate speech in that country violate norms of democratic legitimacy.
33
Were this all Heinze did, his book would be a great advance on the current US-centered state of the literature; but he goes a step further by operationalizing his argument. A democracy should have the resources to combat the discriminatory effects of hate speech if it is longstanding, stable and prosperous.
34 By longstanding, Heinze refers to an unspecified period of time "during which the norms, practices and expectations of democratic citizenship penetrate a substantial portion of the population. "
35 To reach this condition, a state must "maintain, through anti-discrimination regimes, enforceable policies of civic and social pluralism; being "value neutral" on these questions will not cut it. 36 A stable democracy is one that can "police itself, according to independently (e.g. judicially) reviewable criteria. "
37 Finally, a prosperous democracy is one that is "sufficiently wealthy" that "controversial political or cultural events can proceed, with speakers, audiences, and dissenters alike protected from violence. "
38
These terms, moreover, are capable of quantification; using international measurements such as the Democracy Index Report published by the Economist, one can distinguish states that are first-order democracies from those struggling to become genuinely democratic. 39 This allows for the argument that an advanced democracy (such as the United States) might be able to tolerate speech that would pose problems for less well-entrenched democracies (such as Israel and India). 40 of Connecticut or Illinois?" 48 The problem, according to Heinze, with this type of celebratory analysis is not whether it is correct but that the "trophy" for free speech liberalism, "ends up being awarded to a land steeped in corporate dominance, military adventurism, botched death sentences, abusive incarceration and police brutality. " 49 Later, when critiquing the idea that political legitimacy should depend on the popularity of an institution, Heinze asks: "In the Southern US, slavery and then racial segregation once enjoyed 'popular support' in white majority states. Did those institutions therefore become legitimate?"
50
As someone in the United States living through mass incarceration, police brutality -and now the Trump presidency -I find Heinze's frank critiques of our political and social problems refreshing. Heinze also deserves credit for breaking free from the originalist taint of Post's argument. America is not the Urdemocracy, or the fabled city on a hill; 51 rather, the United States is a democratic country with its own problems. In this regard, it is no different from its democratic friends France, Canada, the United Kingdom -or any other country on the Economist's index of democratic states. 52 America's constitutional moment may be foundational for the United States; but from a global perspective it is not foundational for the justification of freedom of speech -it is merely one way to reach Nirvana. Nothing more, nothing less.
America in the Age of Trump -Still an LSPD?
Heinze's untangling of free expression from a discourse of American triumphalism is likely to appeal to those supporters of free speech who have doubts about the suitability of the United States as a role model of free expression. At the same time, Heinze's LSPD model raises questions about whether, after the 2016 elections and the rise of Donald Trump, the United States is still a "longstanding, stable, prosperous democracy. " Might it, instead, be facing its own "time of troubles"? Sitting in the United States, watching journalists face felony charges for covering Trump's inauguration, I wonder about this. 53 Here, the democratic legitimacy argument -both Post's version and Heinze's refinement -seems to come up short: If one believes the United States is entering an era of "soft authoritarianism, " 54 wouldn't protecting speech be more important than ever? More generally, does the democratic legitimacy model which was born in the 1980s and 90s, 55 a time when democracy was riding on the crest of a "third wave"
56 that was supposed to carry democracy to all corners of the globe, have an answer for the age of Trump?
The model might not, but Heinze does. The answer relates to a second admirable feature of Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, namely the depth of Heinze's arguments. For example, he organizes his arguments for and against speech regulation into deontological and consequentialist categories. Banning hate speech might good or bad in and of itself; or the difficulty in restricting or tolerating hate speech might be practical in nature.
57 While Heinze is not the first person to view speech regulation in this manner, his approach is noteworthy for its rigor. Indeed, one of the most impressive qualities of Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship is its rich, detailed typography of arguments for and against hate speech regulation.
58 Not only do these give Heinze's book an ency- Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, p. 34 (using a chart to outline deontological and consequentialist arguments for and against hate speech). 58 For example, Heinze concludes his book with a list of 20 separate arguments for hate speech regulation and his opinion as to why they are wrong. Ibid., clopedic quality, they also let him raise concerns about speech regulation that do not rely on the democratic legitimacy argument.
In this regard, the democratic legitimacy argument provides a floor of free speech protection -longstanding, stable prosperous democracies should not censor -but not a ceiling. An insufficiently democratic society might have a right to punish speech on security grounds, but it need not do this. There are also pragmatic arguments for protecting free speech, ones Heinze highlights in a compelling section of his book entitled "Consequentialist Oppositionism Revisited: Harms of Bans?" 59 Here Heinze argues, among other things: (1) that speech restrictions will still allow bigots to express the same ideas in slightly more guarded language -in effect "tutoring" extremist groups; 60 (2) alternatively, potential bans will drive potential bigots underground, where they will be harder to monitor; 61 and (3) bans will likely fall most heavily on "disempowered target groups. " 62 While these arguments are not entirely new -Nadine Strossen, for instance, raised the concern about targeting minorities decades ago 63 -Heinze presses his point home with a forcefulness and a sensitivity to the power of words to do harm. For example, Heinze notes how extremist groups, tutored by hate speech bans to act appropriately, will make comments about Islam as a religion that, in reality, target Muslims as an ethnic group. 64 For citizens of wavering LSPDs, lapsed LSPDs, or countries simply struggling to become democratic in the first place, this separation of deontological and consequentialist arguments for speech regulation offers comfort in an age of rising right-wing populism across the United States and Europe. 65 At the same time, Heinze's consequentialist arguments operate independently of his democratic legitimacy theory. In theory, for example, Heinze's warning that states will use bans against minority groups applies with equal force in the LSPD context and the non-LSPD context. Could one, however, make an argument that -in an age of increasing autocracy and authoritarianism -freedom of speech is even more important in an imperfectly democratic state than it would be in an LSPD? More narrowly, might one argue that the risk of the state using speech restrictions to stifle dissent is greater in such a circumstance?
Here Heinze offers some interesting insights. In allowing non-LSPDs to punish hate speech, Heinze had in mind societies with "active inter-group rivalries and inadequate means to pacify them", where speech restrictions might be a "necessary evil. " 66 His paradigmatic example is Northern Ireland, where the "time of troubles" justified British imposition of hate speech bans, albeit at the price of concluding the Britain was no longer an LSPD.
67 But in many divided societies (including the United States), there is no higher power, no Britain, to impose order. Under these circumstances, any legitimacy hate speech bans gain on the basis of state security, is lost because the state no longer represents all groups in society. Is the Turkish ban on acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide justified because Turkey is not an LSPD? 68 Or, as is more plausible, is the ban illegitimate, because by the very enactment of the law, the Turkish government excludes Armenians from full citizenship? Likewise, to the extent Trump succumbs to the extreme right-wing elements in his movement, and moves towards explicit white supremacy, 69 should he get the benefit of the greater governmental powers offered to non-LSPDs in conflict-ridden societies?
To be fair, part of the limits of Heinze's theory is a function of the rapid change of conditions on the ground, in the United States and elsewhere. A few years ago, Frederick Schauer re-examined the idea that false speech might have harmful consequences. 70 To show the potential harm of false news, Schauer used a wide range of examples. While some of these were political ("President Obama was born in Kenya, " "President Bush knew in advance of the 9/11 attacks"), 71 others were not. For example, Schauer described those "who promote…diet slippers and diet earrings as sure-fire cures for obesity. " 72 Schauer wrote his article before "fake news" concept became associated with the rise of Donald Trump. To put it another way, Schauer wrote at a time when the United States was, to all appearances, a healthy, functioning LSPD. While Schauer chose his examples in part to demonstrate that Holocaust denial was not a special case -that all false information might theoretically cause harm 73 -he did not linger on the Kenya and 9/11 points because they were not politically salient. Today, when the President of the United States claims -without evidence -that millions voted illegally against him, 74 or that President Obama wiretapped his campaign, 75 "fake news" is a more relevant concept -one tied to deeper questions about the strength of democratic institutions in the United States. Consequently, Schauer's article -while very informative -is likely the beginning, rather than the end, of the discussion about "fake news. " I first read Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship in May 2016 and enjoyed it thoroughly. It is the book I wish I wrote, and a book to take to a desert island. Re-reading the book in March 2017, I still enjoyed it; but something is missing. The Washington Post now runs the words "Democracy Dies in Darkness" on its masthead. 76 If democracy is dying -or is facing a mortal risk -the LSPD theory tells me that it can legitimately impose restrictions on hate speech as a means of self-protection. 77 I get that. But at a time when President Trump has declared the media "the enemy of the American people" 78 there is a need for a theory of free speech (and hate speech regulation) that applies to states that are incompletely democratic, or at risk of slipping away into authoritarianism.
That said, Heinze's robust defense of democratic prerogative represented by the LSPD concept is critical, not merely as an empirical concept but an aspirational one as well. The United States may indeed be in the midst of a "time of troubles" but if it wants to return to the LSPD ranks, it had best start acting like one. 79 Meanwhile, Heinze's forceful, nuanced defense of free speech on conse-quentialist grounds 80 is an excellent starting point for how to think pragmatically about freedom of speech in an age when the civic culture of democracy may be wavering. As such Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship is indeed a book for the age of Trump.
